DOWNLOADABLE SOFTWARE VOTER MANAGEMENT

Brand Owner Address Description
NEXTVOTE Hart InterCivic, Inc. 15500 Wells Port Drive Austin TX 78728 Downloadable software for voter management, namely, voter registration, voter enrollment, voter applications, voter roster management, and voter list deduplication; Downloadable software for poll worker management, namely, poll worker scheduling and communications with poll workers related to scheduling and staffing; Downloadable software for election management; Downloadable software for voter registration; Downloadable software for geographic management of elections, namely, boundary management, polling station management, and redistricting; Downloadable software for absentee voting management, namely, management of incoming requests for absentee ballots, management of outgoing delivery of absentee ballots, and management of absentee voting databases; Downloadable software for election management and configuration, namely, office and candidate management, petition management, and election countdown and progress tracking; Downloadable software for elections management functions, namely, voter registration and enrollment of voters, voter communication, participation history, record history, elections setup, election planning, election task list, managing internal communications, managing internal personnel, candidate management, candidate filings, geographical functions for district boundaries, precincts, streets, and external data, address management, poll worker management, poll worker tracking, poll worker scheduling, polling place management, asset tracking, elections document processing, absentee ballot application, absentee ballot tracking, absentee ballot processing, petition processing and reporting management;NEXT VOTE;
 

Where the owner name is not linked, that owner no longer owns the brand

    
Technical Examples
  1. An election system provides, in one example, each voter with multiple physical "layers" that the voter is able to choose between. The voter takes part of the layers as a kind of receipt and the other layers are retained and/or destroyed by the system. The actual vote is not readily revealed by the layers taken by the voter, thus protecting against improper influence. In the voting booth, when all the layers are combined, however, the voter is readily able to verify the vote. Moreover, posted images of the layers not taken by the voter can be used to compute the election results in a way that is verifiable by interested parties. The results cannot be changed without substantial probability of detection and privacy of votes can be maintained unless a number of parties are compromised or collude.